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Abstract
Based on ethnographic research with over four hundred 
Congolese refugees in Kampala and Kyaka II refugee 
settlement, Uganda, this article interrogates the pol-
itics of education—both historically in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and currently in migration contexts in 
Uganda . Formal education was an aspiration for all young 
people in the study, irrespective of current educational 
level . Moreover, it is a priority for the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and many 
other organizations working with refugees . Drawing on 
the experiences and views of Congolese young people, this 
article analyzes the socio-political importance they accord 
to formal schooling . It then analyzes the degree to which 
these political aspects of education are manifested in daily 
decision-making processes in families, households, com-
munities, and high-level politics . The author concludes 
with some reflections on how researchers and practitioners 
working in migration contexts can recognize and take into 
account the politicized nature of education .
Résumé
Se basant sur des recherches ethnographiques réalisées 
auprès de plus de quatre cents réfugiés congolais dans 
les camps de Kampala et de Kyaka II, en Ouganda, cet 
article s’interroge sur la politique de l’éducation, à la fois 
d’un point de vue historique, dans la République popu-
laire du Congo, et d’un point de vue contemporain, dans 
le contexte de la migration en Ouganda . Tous les jeunes 
gens interrogés dans le cadre de la recherche aspiraient à 
faire des études scolaires, peu importe leur niveau de sco-
larisation actuel . En outre, l’enseignement est une prio-
rité du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les 
réfugiés (UNHCR) et de nombreuses autres organisations 
travaillant avec des réfugiés . S’appuyant sur les expérien-
ces et les opinions des jeunes du Congo, cet article analyse 
l’importance sociopolitique que ces derniers accordent aux 
études scolaires . Il cherche ensuite à définir dans quelle 
mesure les aspects politiques de l’éducation se manifes-
tent dans les procédures de prise de décisions quotidiennes 
des familles, des ménages, des communautés et des hautes 
sphères politiques . L’article se termine par des réflexions 
sur la façon dont les chercheurs et les praticiens travaillant 
dans des contextes de migration peuvent reconnaître et 
tenir compte de la nature politisée de l’éducation .
Introduction
As part of a larger research project focussing on the polit-
ical narratives and experiences of Congolese young people 
living as refugees in Uganda,1 over four hundred research 
subjects were asked about their aspirations for the future. 
All respondents, despite varying levels of formal education 
from none to university level, cited further studies as one of 
their goals. Similarly, development and refugee agencies pri-
oritize formal schooling, citing it is a solution to many prob-
lems, from high birth rates to infant mortality.2 Education 
specialists are better placed to evaluate these claims and 
the technical merits of different types of formal schooling 
in refugee settings.3 Instead, in this article, I explore the 
political reasons for this convergence of opinion about the 
importance of education. In particular, I interrogate the 
ways in which formal education is implicitly and explicitly 
linked to class and power relations—both historically in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as in contem-
porary situations of displacement for Congolese refugees 
in Kampala and Kyaka II refugee settlement in Uganda. 
Through an analysis of decision making at household, com-
munity, and policy levels, the article also highlights the 
ways in which power relations create opportunities and 
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barriers to realizing the anticipated political benefits of for-
mal schooling.
Research findings reveal that formal education impacts 
power relations within families and households, particu-
larly amongst peers. Similarly, schooling facilitates young 
people’s access to, and visibility in, formal community 
decision-making structures. In high-level politics, such as 
access to political office, however, the benefits of formal 
education for refugees are less clear-cut. While education 
intersects with class and provides some political visibility, it 
does not necessarily lead directly to the tangible economic 
and political benefits for which many young Congolese in 
refugee contexts hope. This analysis of the politics of edu-
cation at family, household, community, and policy levels 
demonstrates the importance of recognizing and taking 
into account the politicized nature of formal schooling 
when working with refugees. The article concludes with 
some implications for research and practice.
Research Context, Methodology, and Conceptual 
Framework
Research presented in this article was carried out with 
Congolese refugees in Kampala and Kyaka II refugee settle-
ment from September 2004 to December 2005. Uganda’s cap-
ital city, Kampala is a large urban centre that has attracted 
migrants from across the country, as well as neighbouring 
states in the Great Lakes region. However, according to the 
settlement policy in Uganda at the time of research,4 refu-
gees are not officially supposed to live in the city and thus do 
not receive humanitarian assistance or have access to social 
services. In contrast, Kyaka II is a designated refugee settle-
ment in an isolated, rural area of western Uganda. Refugees 
arriving in the settlement are registered, documented, and 
allocated a plot of land, where they are supposed to engage 
in subsistence farming under the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)/Government of 
Uganda self-reliance strategy.
I collected data using a variety of qualitative methods, 
including semi-structured interviews, focus group discus-
sions, writing exercises, and observation. Over four hun-
dred research subjects were identified using snowball and 
purposive sampling. Snowball sampling can result in bias 
towards respondents who share certain characteristics and/
or are more visible, thereby undermining representivity.5 
Purposive sampling was thus also used to identify research 
subjects through multiple entry points. Despite time and 
logistical constraints, the study sought to include young 
people of different ethnicity, sex, and age, living in differ-
ent circumstances. I carried out research, without inter-
pretation, in French, English, and basic Swahili. However, 
due to my limited Swahili language skills, the research 
over-represents people who could speak some French or 
English and hence had completed some formal education. 
There is a consequent bias towards middle-class research 
subjects. I have translated all direct quotations in French or 
Swahili into English.
Data included in the article were collected as part of a 
larger study exploring the political engagement of young 
Congolese refugees in Uganda. The research took as its 
point of departure an approach to young people as polit-
ical actors and interrogated the ways in which young people 
engaged in decision making at family, household, commun-
ity, and policy levels. In this way, the study was not specific-
ally focused on education. Rather, education—particularly 
higher education—emerged as a theme in discussions with 
young refugees about their plans and hopes for the future. 
When probed about the reasons why they aspired to higher 
education, many cited a belief that formal schooling would 
bring them status and hence greater access to decision mak-
ing. This paper explores these political meanings ascribed to 
formal education and the degree to which they are realized 
for young people in the study.
My political analysis takes into account both formal 
high-level political processes and the politics of everyday 
life. Such an approach “challenges the conventional view 
of politics as limited to formal processes of governments 
and market relationships in the public sphere.”6 Both refu-
gees and young people are noticeably absent, and usually 
legally excluded, from these high-level institutions and 
the formal economy. In Uganda, for example, refugees are 
legally prohibited from participating in political activities, 
while in the DRC, people under the age of eighteen are 
legally disenfranchised. However, Congolese young people 
are integral—although not necessarily equal—members 
of households, families, and communities in Kyaka II and 
Kampala. Building on the feminist notion that the personal 
is political, this article broadly conceptualizes “politics” to 
include decision-making processes from family to policy 
levels: “The political cannot be restricted to a certain type 
of institution, or envisaged as constituting a specific sphere 
or level of society. It must be conceived as a dimension that 
is inherent in every human society and that determines our 
very ontological condition.”7 Such an approach allows an 
interrogation of the ways in which access to, and experi-
ences of, formal education are inherently politicized—that 
is, bound up within power relations and linked to decision-
making processes and structures.
In this article, “young people” refers to all individuals 
who have passed puberty, but who have not yet married. 
This is a social definition that emerged from the majority of 
my research subjects’ experiences and views on childhood, 
youth, adulthood, and old age in their changing social 
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contexts. Such a perspective differs from many prevailing 
chronological definitions of children and young people that 
are codified in international law, particularly the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
It is these legal chronological definitions that are the basis of 
programmatic interventions by many organizations work-
ing on the ground. However, many scholars have argued 
that childhood is socially constructed in particular times 
and places.8 In this paper, “social age” is thus distinguished 
from biological development in a way similar to gender and 
sex.9 A social age analysis takes into account the socially 
constructed roles ascribed to children and young people, 
as well as power dynamics in inter- and intragenerational 
relationships. In this paper, particular attention will be paid 
to these micro-level politics in relation to formal education 
and access to decision making in families and households.
The term “refugee” is used to describe the circumstances 
of people who have come to Uganda in the context of gen-
eralized conflict and insecurity in the DRC. It therefore 
applies not only to those who have been legally recog-
nized as refugees by the Government of Uganda and/or the 
UNHCR, but also to those who self-identify as refugees but 
have not formally registered as such with UN and govern-
ment officials. In keeping with many of my informants’ self-
definition, I prefer to use the term “Congolese” rather than 
“refugee” to describe them.
Finally, in this paper, education is used narrowly to refer 
only to formal, classroom education. While it is recognized 
that young refugees may also experience other forms of edu-
cation, including mentoring and apprenticeship, in keeping 
with the theme of this special issue, I will focus solely on 
formal schooling here.
Illustrative Case Study: Marie’s Experiences
I will now highlight the experiences of one young Congolese 
woman, “Marie,”10 as an illustrative case. The following is 
an excerpt from a much longer narrative, which was con-
structed over several interviews and meetings with Marie 
during ethnographic research over a fifteen-month per-
iod.11 Marie’s situation is not intended to be representative 
of all four hundred Congolese young people in the study. 
Indeed, her experiences are exceptional because she is one 
of very few refugees to win a scholarship to study at uni-
versity. Rather, her story illustrates some broader themes 
about the politics of education that will be compared and 
contrasted with the experiences of young people from the 
larger dataset, some of whom I cite in the analysis below.
Marie is from Bukavu, South Kivu, in eastern DRC. 
While fleeing armed conflict in 1996 (when Marie was in 
her early teens), she was separated from her family. Upon 
arrival in Uganda, Marie went to Kyangwali refugee settle-
ment to look for her family. She met another Congolese 
family, with whom she stayed until 1998. Marie initially 
supported herself by selling cloth until she won a scholar-
ship from the Hugh Pilkington Charitable Trust (now the 
Windle Trust) to study social work and social administra-
tion at university. While she was on scholarship, “they paid 
for everything.”
After completing her bachelor’s degree in late 2003, Marie 
looked for employment. Despite her university qualifica-
tion in an applied field and knowledge of English, French, 
Swahili, and Luganda, she was unable to find work. So, she 
volunteered at a refugee organization as a translator. She 
also did some counselling there, and felt like she was able 
to practically use her social work degree. Marie received a 
small stipend of 5,000 USH12 for each day she volunteered 
and thus earned enough to pay basic expenses, including 
30,000 USH room rent. However, in May 2004, the refugee 
organization, citing confidentiality reasons, decided that it 
would no longer use refugees as translators. Marie then tried 
to make ends meet by giving English and French lessons 
for 10,000 USH per student per month. She also continued 
to look for work at other refugee and development organ-
izations, but has been unsuccessful. Marie believed that she 
was being discriminated against because of her nationality. 
With the high level of unemployment in Uganda, Marie 
assumed that the Ugandan government put pressure on 
organizations to hire Ugandans.
In 2000, she discovered that her sixteen-year-old sister 
and thirteen-year-old nephew were living in an orphanage 
in Bukavu, run by a Catholic priest. Marie did not know 
where the rest of her family was and has lost hope of ever 
finding them. In July 2004, her sister and nephew came to 
live with her in Kampala after fleeing renewed fighting in 
Bukavu, during which her sister was raped.
Marie was actively involved in an association for refu-
gee youth in Kampala and had strong opinions about 
UNHCR policy and issues facing Congolese young people. 
She argued that UNHCR should do more to help Congolese 
young people to study, “since you need education for a bet-
ter future.”
By January 2005, Marie was finding it increasingly dif-
ficult to make ends meet in Kampala through odd teaching 
jobs. UNHCR had rejected her application for resettlement, 
saying that she had “durable solutions” in Uganda because 
of her education and knowledge of languages. However, 
Marie felt that they did not understand her challenges in 
finding work and integrating into Ugandan society.
In August 2005, Marie’s cousin and sister returned 
to the DRC because it was too difficult for her to support 
them without a stable income. In October 2005, her brother, 
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who had been living in South Africa, died. Marie collected 
money from friends and family in order to buy a plane ticket 
to South Africa, so she could attend the funeral. By the end 
of my fieldwork in December 2005, she had not returned to 
Kampala.
Despite the uniqueness of Marie’s case, it illustrates 
several themes about the politics of education, which are 
reflected in the broader dataset. First, as mentioned in 
the introduction, every young person in my study, despite 
their very different backgrounds, cited education as a hope 
for the future. Indeed, even though Marie had not yet tan-
gibly benefited from her university degree in terms of stable 
employment, she insisted that UNHCR should provide 
young people with more educational opportunities “since 
you need education for a better future.” This belief in a “bet-
ter future” through education echoes many other young 
people’s views. For example, David, a young Congolese 
male in Kampala, said, “I know that a good future depends 
on education. If I have a good education, the future will be 
OK.” According to eighteen-year-old Gaston in Kyaka II, 
because he has never studied, he thinks that he will have “a 
bad future.” Beaumont, living with his family in Kyaka II, 
reported that he could only consider the future after com-
pleting school: “If I had the means, I could study. After my 
studies, I could make plans.” This convergence of opinion is 
interesting: why do research subjects consider education to 
be so important for their future goals?
The following sections demonstrate how young people 
aspire to and/or use formal schooling as a means to greater 
decision making at household, community, and policy 
levels. This political analysis highlights the transforma-
tive potential of education, but also the ways in which for-
mal schooling may entrench power relations, particularly 
through class and differential access. In this way, formal 
education only partially fulfills the aspirations that Marie 
and the other young people in the study attribute to it, espe-
cially in terms of high-level politics.
High-Level Politics, Class, and Power
Before analyzing the relationship between formal educa-
tion and high-level decision making in refugee contexts in 
Uganda, it is important to foreground this discussion within 
the historical context in the DRC. There, since colonization, 
education has been a means to social status, wealth, and 
political power. Under Belgian rule, Congolese with formal 
western education qualified for white-collar employment 
and occupied a special status as évolués (literally translated 
as “evolved people”), which they passed on to their chil-
dren.13 At independence, évolués consolidated their position 
as members of the upper middle class and political elite.14 
Formal education thus partially determines social class in 
the DRC, with important political implications.
Similarly, many Congolese living in Uganda identified 
the intersection of education and socio-political status, as 
shown in my analysis of data from writing exercises collected 
from 148 (107 male and 41 female)15 students in secondary 
school and upper-level primary school in Kyaka II refugee 
settlement. These written statements reveal a widespread 
belief among students that education will enable them to 
become “big people” (including: teacher, headmaster, doc-
tor, nurse, bank manager, lawyer, engineer, NGO driver, 
pilot, tax collector, police official, minister, Member of 
Parliament, president) with “important” decision-making 
roles. For example, one male student wrote, “In the future, 
I want to be a doctor treating people because someone 
who has education has the right to speak in the commun-
ity.” Similarly, another young male argued, “If you are talk-
ing in public, they will listen to you.” On several occasions, 
Peter, a youth leader in Kyaka II, described the perceived 
link between education and leadership and decision-mak-
ing opportunities. When asked about his future aspirations, 
he said, “My plans are very big. I don’t know if they will 
come. I want to study. Then I can be a leader and do my 
best to explain the problems facing refugees in public … in 
the UN.” In a later discussion about the political situation 
of people from the Hema ethnic group in the DRC, Peter 
returned to the topic of formal schooling: “I need education 
to protect myself when I go back. We the Hema are cattle 
keepers and they say we’re not supposed to study. No one 
can see us as educated, as a president, a doctor, a minister. 
But, if we come back educated, they will see that Hema can 
also be politicians, so will harass Hema less.”
Peter’s belief in education as a way to political leadership 
is echoed by many others in my study. Some young people, 
such as eighteen-year-old Francis, who lives with peers in 
Kyaka II, believe that educated leaders will bring peace and 
development to the DRC: “You can bring development when 
you finish your education.” Similarly, Eric and Etienne, self-
described “intellectuals” and members of a refugee associa-
tion in Kyaka II, would like to study at university and return 
to the DRC to “help the common people” and “to contribute 
to the reconstruction of my country,” respectively. Philippe, 
a male adult in Kyaka II, declared that his “only wish” was 
for his children to study “so that they can become people 
to lead our country. Otherwise, how can one lead? […] We 
need a man who is well cultured and wise.” Philippe’s use of 
the word “man,” and the fact that all other examples (except 
Marie) cited above come from males, is reflective of differ-
ential gender implications of education, as will be discussed 
in the final section below.
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While the expected benefits of formal schooling in 
terms of political leadership and access to high-level deci-
sion making are clear, the tangible value of education for 
Congolese young people living in refugee contexts in 
Uganda is ambiguous, as illustrated in Marie’s case. Despite 
her university education, she is unable to find full-time 
employment. The assumed causal connection between 
formal schooling and higher-paying, white-collar jobs is 
thus not necessarily reflected in the experiences of young 
people in this study. In contexts of widespread poverty and 
unemployment, such professional positions may be scarce, 
and priority could be given to citizens of the host country, 
as in Marie’s case. Moreover, formal education does not 
necessarily prepare graduates for the working class jobs that 
are available. Schooling removes young people from the 
labour force for the duration of their studies, during which 
they may not benefit from practical apprenticeships and on-
the-job experience that they otherwise would have gained.16 
More importantly, the status attached to formal education 
and the societal expectations of white-collar work make 
graduates reluctant to take on jobs that are available and 
potentially lucrative, but are perceived to be “below them.” 
For example, Marie made good money selling cloth before 
she started university. However, now that she has a degree, 
she would not consider any kind of petty trading, believ-
ing that the only jobs worthy of her education are in NGOs, 
multilateral agencies, or teaching.
Indeed, those refugees from urban, educated back-
grounds who found themselves living beside uneducated 
Congolese in Kampala’s slums and Kyaka II refugee settle-
ment often self-identified as “intellectuals” to distinguish 
themselves from others whom they regarded as “peasants” 
or “villagers.” Philippe, the adult head of family cited 
above, described his life in Kyaka II: “It is not good here 
because we Congolese, we are used to having money and 
living a bourgeois life. Now we are like villagers. We have 
moved 12,000 kilometres backwards. I’m an intellectual, 
but I find myself here like a small ant.” In an informal dis-
cussion with self-identified young évolués, one lamented, 
“After six months in this bush, I will no longer be an intel-
lectual.” This differentiation amongst refugees demon-
strates the continued relevance of class in refugee con-
texts, even when people from different backgrounds live 
in similar situations. In this way, education continues to 
be an important marker of status in refugee communities. 
For example, teachers at Bujubuli Secondary School are 
highly respected in Kyaka II, referred to simply as “teacher” 
as a term of respect. They are also given credit at shops 
and bars. Secondary students also take pride in the vis-
ible marker of education that their school uniforms bring, 
even though uniforms increase the cost of their schooling, 
making it unattainable for many.
In contrast, those young people who were previously 
educated in the DRC, but who can not afford to attend 
school in Uganda, keenly feel this loss of status and direc-
tion. For example, Véronique, a young women living with 
her family in Kampala, explains why she does not have 
any Ugandan friends: “I just stay at home. Ugandans go to 
school, so there is no way to meet them. If you don’t go to 
school, they look at you as a ragamuffin. They see you as 
worthless. For me, I just cry because I want to go to school.” 
I observed the social impact of education on Olivier, a 
young male who came from a prominent, wealthy family 
in eastern DRC. When he first arrived in Kyaka II, his 
mother could not afford school fees. Olivier was despond-
ent and dismissive of the low quality of education in the 
settlement. However, once he started attending school in 
February 2005, his spirits improved dramatically. He made 
many friends, including Peter (cited above), with whom he 
discussed homework and set tests.
Community Politics and Access to Policy Makers
Social status and class are linked to another level of analy-
sis in this study: decision making in formal community 
structures. Here, the link between education and political 
access is clear. Like Marie in the refugee youth association 
in Kampala, the majority of young people in leadership pos-
itions in refugee organizations and structures have at least 
secondary education. At the time of research, the execu-
tive committees of two such associations analyzed for this 
study were composed only of young people with secondary 
or university education. Moreover, the designated “youth” 
representative on the Refugee Welfare Committee, a formal 
representative structure in Kyaka II, was enrolled in sec-
ondary school, where he also occupied a student leadership 
position.
Education also increases political opportunities at a 
policy level because UNHCR, the Ugandan government, 
and many NGOs use schools as sites in which to “mobil-
ize” young people, either to engage in “sensitization activ-
ities” or to undertake “consultations” regarding policy 
or programming.17 Researchers also often use schools as 
convenient sites for accessing children and young people. 
Moreover, extracurricular activities for young people are 
usually based at schools, making them more accessible 
to those enrolled in formal education. As a result, young 
people in formal schooling have greater access to decision 
making and programming than their counterparts who do 
not attend school.
The ability to speak a western language is another concrete 
political asset of formal education. Instruction in schools is 
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in French in the DRC and English in Uganda. This know-
ledge of French or English, coupled with exposure to “sensi-
tization” activities (described above), allows young people 
with formal education to speak the same language—literally 
and figuratively—as policy makers from NGOs, UNHCR, 
and governments.18 In public debates on high-level political 
issues, French and English are also used as the lingua franca 
in the absence of a common national vernacular language 
in the DRC and Uganda, respectively. Even in the context 
of the study upon which this article is based, when research 
subjects discussed high-level political issues, including 
leadership, elections, and citizenship, I observed a change 
in their grammar and vocabulary. They used formal French 
in these circumstances, sometimes switching from English, 
even when this excluded non-francophone peers. Research 
subjects are more eager to learn English than Luganda in 
Kampala and Lutoro in Kyaka II. For example, Bondeko, a 
young male who lives with his younger sister in Kampala, 
takes English lessons at Jesuit Refugee Services, but is not 
interested in learning Luganda: “At least English is an inter-
national language.” This analysis shows that formal school-
ing increased young people’s access to formal decision-mak-
ing structures in communities, as well as made them more 
visible to policy makers.
Education and Social Age:  
Micro-politics in Families and Communities
At the third level of analysis, formal schooling is import-
ant in the micro-politics of everyday interactions in families 
and communities. First, knowledge is an attribute of social 
age19 in many Congolese groups. Historically, knowledge 
has been equated with the wisdom of experience. Research 
subjects, particularly adults, attributed certain levels of 
knowledge or intellectual development to different stages 
in the life cycle. They believed that children are by defin-
ition ignorant, young people have more knowledge, and 
adults, particularly elders, are inherently wise. For example, 
Murhabazi, an older Congolese leader in Kyaka II, defined 
a child as “someone who is not yet conscious of what he’s 
doing, who can’t form plans.” Similarly, another male elder 
considered a child as “someone who doesn’t reason” and 
a young person as “someone who doesn’t understand.” 
However, formal education is an increasingly important 
influence on access to decision making within families 
and communities, especially in contexts of migration and 
urbanization. While full-time education or a hiatus in stud-
ies results in prolongation of childhood or youth, education 
is seen as an investment that will eventually yield higher 
socio-political status.
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that formal 
schooling has the potential to transform intergenerational 
power relations, especially in migration contexts where stu-
dents learn the language of the host country in school. In 
the present study, young people with more formal school-
ing than one or both parents often represent their family in 
interactions with refugee and Ugandan officials that require 
knowledge of a western language. Research undertaken in 
other contexts also shows how the fact that children become 
spokespeople for their families increases their access to 
decision-making processes.20
Education is also important for intragenerational rela-
tionships, as demonstrated in my analysis of decision mak-
ing within households composed of peers. In forced migra-
tion contexts, such peer networks may be more prevalent 
than in home countries prior to migration due to family 
separation and changing social norms with respect to 
unmarried young people moving out of family networks.21 
In my long-term observation of various peer households in 
both Kampala and Kyaka II, I noted that formal schooling 
factored into young people’s access to decision making. This 
is demonstrated in Marie’s case, for example, by her inter-
actions with her sister and cousin, who both dropped out of 
secondary school at an early age. I had little opportunity to 
interact with Marie’s younger relatives, even when I made 
explicit attempts to do so. On one visit to Marie’s home to 
interview her younger sister, for example, I instead encoun-
tered an informal discussion amongst Marie and some of her 
educated friends. The younger relatives were not engaged in 
the conversation and at one point Marie asked her sister and 
nephew to go and prepare tea, effectively removing them 
from the research site.
Similarly, in a peer household in Kyaka II composed of 
young people who were from the same ethnic group but 
were not related to one another, fifteen-year-old Dominic 
was the only male to attend primary school. All others were 
studying, or had studied, at secondary school. Although 
of similar chronological age to his peers, Dominic was 
considered to be socially younger than other males in the 
household and had consequently less access to decision 
making about collective resources and division of labour. 
For example, when other males were present, Dominic 
rarely spoke. Indeed, when asked about decision making 
in the household, he named Benjamin—the eldest male, 
who had also completed secondary school—as the person 
responsible. Similarly, Catherine, the eldest female in the 
group, described Dominic’s labour as “children’s work.”
In analyzing the micro-politics of education in families 
and households, it is also important to recognize gender 
relations. Indeed, young men and women in this study 
experience and view education differently. The former 
believe education will open up decision-making oppor-
tunities in community and policy spaces; the latter see 
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education primarily in terms of negotiating power relations 
and decision making within families and households. This 
highlights the intersection of multiple subject positions, 
including gender, class, and social age, in determining the 
political salience of education.
The Politics of Education: Implications for 
Research and Practice
While education is often discussed in socio-economic 
terms, this article has highlighted the politics of educa-
tion–in terms of both the political aspirations ascribed to 
formal schooling by young refugees themselves, and the 
way in which education intersects with other power rela-
tions in decision-making processes in families, households, 
communities, and policy spaces. The data presented in this 
article demonstrate that, while there is no automatic link-
age between formal schooling and stable, well-paid employ-
ment, young people like Marie who complete secondary or 
tertiary education gain socio-political status in families and 
communities. Moreover, they are more likely to be visible 
and vocal in policy and programming decision making 
with government authorities, UN agencies, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations.
It is important that practitioners and researchers work-
ing in migration contexts recognize this politicization 
of education, because it presents opportunities for social 
transformation, but it can also entrench power relations, 
especially through intersectionality with other factors, 
such as class, social age, and gender. On the one hand, 
provision of “free” or subsidized education in refugee con-
texts may allow access for those who would otherwise be 
unable to afford it. Indeed, according to the headmaster of 
Bujubuli Secondary School in Kyaka II, the fact that school 
fees are much lower than those in surrounding Ugandan 
and Congolese schools has been a pull factor to the settle-
ment, including for some Congolese who were previously 
living in, or whose families have since returned to, the 
DRC. This is corroborated by data presented in this article, 
including the fact that young people without their par-
ents were disproportionately represented in the secondary 
school. Increased access for those who would otherwise not 
be able to afford formal education could potentially change 
the socio-political landscape as “peasants” and “villagers” 
join “intellectuals” in schools.
On the other hand, even “free” or subsidized education 
is still beyond the economic means of many Congolese 
(and Ugandans). Those attending primary school still have 
to pay for books, supplies, and “community contributions” 
to school lunch and maintenance programs. School fees at 
the secondary school are still prohibitively high for many, 
at one point sparking a peaceful demonstration in Kyaka 
II.22 Moreover, formal education entails a prohibitively high 
opportunity cost for many families that rely on children’s 
and young people’s productive and reproductive labour. 
Indeed, school authorities at the primary and secondary 
schools in Kyaka II report low attendance during periods 
of peak agricultural activity (planting and harvest) in the 
settlement. This means that young people from poorer 
socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to go to school 
and/or to continue to higher levels of education.
Refugee organizations must more proactively address 
this intersection of language, class, and education when 
interacting with refugees. Similarly, researchers must con-
sciously seek out research subjects from different socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds. One concrete way to increase the visi-
bility of working class refugees in policy dialogue and data 
collection is to place greater emphasis on local language 
training for organizations’ staff and researchers. This would 
allow greater direct access of refugees with little or no for-
mal education to policy makers taking important decisions 
about their lives. Indeed, this article has revealed the ways 
in which access to formal education and decision-making 
processes at various levels are interrelated. Overlooking the 
politics of education can thus undermine its transforma-
tive potential and instead entrench unequal power relations 
within refugee contexts.
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